Towards a mathematical theory of machine discovery from facts  by Mukouchi, Yasuhito & Arikawa, Setsuo
Towards 
Theomical 
Computer Science 
Theoretical Computer Science 137 (1995) 53-84 
a mathematical theory of machine discovery 
from facts* 
Yasuhito Mukouchi*, Setsuo Arikawa 
Research Institute of Fundamental Information Science, Kyushu University 33,Fukuoka 812, Japan 
Abstract 
This paper intends to give a theoretical foundation of machine discovery from facts. We point 
out that the essence of a computational logic of scientific discovery or a logic of machine 
discovery is the refutability of the entire spaces of hypotheses. We discuss this issue in the 
framework of inductive inference of length-bounded elementary formal systems (EFSs), which 
are a kind of logic programs over strings of characters and correspond to context-sensitive 
grammars in Chomsky hierarchy. 
First we present some characterization theorems on inductive inference machines that can 
refute hypothesis paces. Then we show differences between our inductive inference and some 
other related inferences uch as in the criteria of reliable identification, finite identification and 
identification in the limit. Finally we show that for any n, the class, i.e. hypothesis space, of 
length-bounded EFSs with at most n axioms is inferable in our sense, that is, the class is 
refutable by a consistently working inductive inference machine. This means that sufficiently 
large hypothesis spaces are identifiable and refutable. 
1. Introduction 
In the middle of this century the logic of scientific discovery was deeply discussed by 
philosophers [26,27]. Recently in Artificial Intelligence, especially in Cognitive 
Science, researchers are extensively discussing frameworks for scientific discovery 
from various viewpoints [36]. They have obtained a lot of rich results on the 
components of scientific behavior such as scientific knowledge structures and scient- 
ific activities. However, they look little dependent on the philosophical results. 
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Before going into such detailed discussions, we need to setup a computational logic 
of scientific discovery in a mathematical way so that we can precisely discuss what 
kinds of machine discovery can help. One of the best ways to do this should be to 
reexamine the philosophical results from computational viewpoints. In the present 
paper, we start with making the Popperian logic of scientific discovery computational. 
The logic of scientific discovery is essentially a triad of problem discovery, solution 
invention and critical test [38]. Popper was mainly interested in the final stage but not 
so much in the first two stages. More exactly the Popperian logic of scientific 
discovery concentrated on the testability, falsifiability or refutability of hypotheses or 
scientific theories. He also asserted that scientific theory should have been refuted by 
observed facts and any such theory could by no means be verified [26]. Thus, we 
tentatively believe the current theory until we face with an observation which is 
inconsistent with the theory. 
His assertion had an influence on the studies of inductive inference started with 
Gold’s identification in the limit, some of which is called Popperian induction [4]. 
A Popperian inductive inference machine [ 133 produces only recursive programs as 
its guesses, which makes each hypothesis testable and refutable. Then the consistent 
and conservative inductive inference can be viewed as a computational realization of 
the Popperian notion of refutability. In inductive inference, the inference machine 
requires data or facts from time to time and produces hypotheses from time to time. 
The hypotheses produced by the machine are to be consistent with the facts read so 
far, and each of them is to be refuted when the machine faces with inconsistent data or 
facts. Here we note that there still exist other possibilities to realize Popper’s refuta- 
tion principle in the context of inductive inference, even when an inductive inference 
machine produces nonrecursive programs. 
Thus the Popperian logic of scientific discovery can be viewed as a basis of modern 
inductive inference studies. And inductive inference is a mathematical basis of 
machine learning. Then what should be a logic of machine discovery or a computational 
logic of scientific discovery? 
The machine discovery we are concerned with in this paper is to make computers 
discover some scientific theories from given data or facts. Hence, machine learning 
should be a key technology for machine discovery. In fact, by using machine learning 
techniques many results have been reported by many authors [36]. In machine 
learning, first we must select a hypothesis space from which the learning machine 
proposes theories or hypotheses. The space is naturally required to be large, but to 
make the learning efficient it is required to be small. As far as data or facts are 
presented according to a hypothesis that is unknown but guaranteed to be in the 
space as in the ordinary inductive inference, the machine will eventually identify the 
hypothesis, and hence no problem may arise. In machine discovery, however, we 
cannot assume this. God knows whether or not a hypothesis behind the data or facts 
belongs to the space. 
If the hypothesis is not in the space, most learning machines will continue for ever to 
search the space for a new hypothesis. Usually, we cannot know the time when to stop 
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such an effective searching. This is the most crucial problem we must solve in realizing 
machine discovery systems. In machine discovery the sequences of data or facts are 
given at first independently of the space. We cannot give in advance the space that 
includes the desired theory. As stated above, however, we have to keep the space as 
small as possible without any guarantee that the theory is in it. If the learning machine 
can explicitly tell us that there are no theories in the space which explain the given 
sequence, the machine will work for machine discovery. 
Hence, the essence of a computational ogic of scientific discovery should be that 
the entire hypothesis pace is refutable by a sequence of observed data or facts. If there 
exist rich hypothesis paces that can be refuted, we can give a space and a sequence to 
the machine, and then we can just wait for an output from it. The machine will 
discover a hypothesis which is producing the sequence if it is in the space, otherwise it 
will refute the whole space and stop. When the space is refuted, we may give another 
space to the machine and try to make such a discovery in the new space. 
In this paper we choose inductive inference as the framework for machine learning. 
Then the machine discovery system is an inductive inference machine that can refute 
hypothesis spaces. In order to make our discussion clearer we also choose, as the 
hypothesis spaces, classes of elementary formal systems (EFSs) which are a kind of 
logic programs over strings of characters. Thus, we are concerned with formal 
languages in this paper. Moreover, we assume that every class in question be an 
indexed family of recursive languages, which is of special interest with respect to 
potential applications. This assumption is quite natural to make a grammar, i.e. 
a hypothesis or theory, refutable by an observation and also to generate grammars as 
hypotheses automatically and successively. Note here that any indexed family of 
recursive languages is identifiable in the limit from complete data, i.e., positive and 
negative data, but the class of all recursive languages is not such a family. Hence, it is 
reasonable to choose some subclasses of the recursive languages as the hypothesis 
spaces for machine learning and machine discovery. 
If the class is a finite set of recursive languages, it is trivially refutable from complete 
data. Also if the class contains all finite languages, it is easily shown not to be 
refutable. Then are there any meanin@ classes, i.e., hypothesis spaces, that are 
identifiable and refutable? We give a positive answer to this question. We will call such 
classses to be refutably inferable. 
First we show some characterizations of such inductive inference. Then we show 
that some sufficiently large classes of normal languages are refutably inferable from 
complete data, while the classes that are refutably inferable only from positive data are 
very small. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents basic notions and definitions 
necessary for our discussion. In Section 3, we discuss some conditions on refutable 
inferability from positive data or complete data. Concerning refutable inferability 
from positive data, we present some necessary and sufficient conditions and reveal that 
the power is very small. Then in Section 4, we show the differences between the 
inferable classes in the criteria of refutable identification, reliable identification, finite 
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identification and identification in the limit. Among them the reliable identification is 
the only inference that deals with sequences from the hypotheses not in the given 
spaces. However, as we will see in Section 2, the reliable inference machine does not 
tell us that the sequence is not in the space, but it just does not converge to any 
hypothesis in the space. In Sections 5 and 6, we present some natural classes that are 
refutably inferable from complete data. First we show that a class which consists of 
unions of at most II concepts from n classes is refutably inferable from complete data if 
each class satisfies a certain condition. Then we show our main result: The classes 
definable by length-bounded EFSs with at most n axioms are refutably inferable from 
complete data, and reveal that there are sufficiently large classes that are refutably 
inferable from complete data. 
2. Preliminaries 
We start with basic definitions and notions on inductive inference of indexed 
families of recursive concepts. 
Let U be a recursively enumerable set to which we refer as a universal set. Then we 
call LG U a concepf. In case the universal set U is the set C + of all nonnull finite 
strings over a finite alphabet Z, we also call LE U a language. 
Definition. Let N={1,2,... } be the set of all natural numbers. A class %‘= {Li}ieN of 
concepts is said to be an indexed family of recursive concepts if there is a recursive 
function f: N x U-(0, l} such that 
f 0, w) = 
1 if weLi, 
0 otherwise. 
In what follows, we assume that a class of concepts is an indexed family of recursive 
concepts without any notice, and identify a class with hypothesis space. 
Definition. A positive presentation, or a text, of a nonempty concept L is an infinite 
sequence wl, w2, . . . of elements in the universal set U such that {wl, w2, . ..> = L. 
A complete presentation, or an informant, of a concept L is an infinite sequence (wl, tl), 
(W2, tz), .** ofelementsinU~{+,-}suchthat{w~)t~=+,i~1}=Land{w~~t~=-, 
i B l} = L”( = U\ L). In what follows, (T or 6 denotes a positive or complete presenta- 
tion, and o[n] denotes the g’s initial segment of length n3 1. For a positive or 
complete presentation 0, each element in 0 is called a fact. For a positive presentation 
(T, a[n]’ denotes the set of all facts in a[n]. For a complete presentation CJ, a[n]+ 
(resp., o[n]-) denotes the set of all elements in the universal set U that appear in o[n] 
with the sign + (resp., the sign -), that is, g[n]+={Wil(Wi, +)Eo[n]} and 
a[n]-={Wil(Wi, -)Ea[n]>. 
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A set T is said to be consistent with a concept L if Tc L. A pair (T, F) of sets is said 
to be consistent with a concept L, if TEL and F c L’. For a positive presentation 
0 and for n> 1, the finite sequence a[n] is said to be consistent with a concept L if 
a[n]’ c L. For a complete presentation CJ and for n > 1, the finite sequence a[n] is said 
to be consistent with a concept L if o[n] ’ EL and o[n] - c L’. 
For two sequences I,+~ and ti2, the sequence which is obtained by concatenating 
$I with ti2 is denoted by +i *ij2. 
Here we note that for a class %‘={Li}iEN and explicitly given finite set T, F c U, 
whether or not Tc Li and whether or not (T, F) is consistent with Li are recursively 
decidable for any index i, because for any WE U, whether or not WE Li is recursively 
decidable. 
The notion of consistency was introduced by Birzdin [l l] and Blum and Blum 
cw 
Definition. An inductive inference machine (IIM) is an effective procedure, or a certain 
type of Turing machine, which requests inputs from time to time and produces 
positive integers from time to time. An inductive inference machine that can refute 
hypothesis spaces (RIIM) is an effective procedure, or a certain type of Turing 
machine, which requests inputs from time to time and either (i) produces positive 
integers from time to time or (ii) refutes the class and stops after producing some 
positive integers. The outputs produced by a machine are called guesses. 
For an IIM or an RIIM M and a nonempty initial segment a[n] = wl, w2, . . . , w, of 
a positive or complete presentation, we define M(a[n]) as follows: Initialize and start 
M. If it requests a fact for the ith time with 1 <i<n, then feed Wi and continue the 
execution. 
(I) In case M requests the (n + 1)st fact, or it stops after it requested the nth fact. If 
it produces a positive integer or the ‘refutation’ sign after it requested the nth fact, then 
let M(o[n]) be the last integer or the ‘refutation’ sign produced by M, otherwise, let 
M(o[n])=O. 
(II) In case M stops before requesting the nth fact, let M(a[n])=O. 
(III) Otherwise, leave M(o[n]) undefined. 
To denote the latest valid output of an IIM or an RIIM on input o[n], we introduce 
the notation of n;i(a[n]). 
For an IIM or an RIIM M, we define n;i(a[n]) as follows. 
(I) Suppose M(a[n]) is defined: (i) If there is the ‘refutation’ sign in the sequence 
MWI), M(d21), . . . , M(o[n]), then let I\;i(o[n]) be the ‘refutation’ sign. (ii) Other- 
wise, if there is a positive integer in the sequence M(o[l]), M(a[2]), . . . , M(o[n]), then 
let R;i(a[n]) be the last positive integer in the sequence, otherwise let n;i(cr[n])=O. 
(II) Otherwise, leave n;i(a[n]) undefined. 
For an IIM or RIIM M, it is easy to see that for any n> 1, if M(a[n]) is defined, 
then MWI), M(@l),, . . . , M(o[n- 11) are also defined. 
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The intended interpretation is as follows: (i) In case M(c[n]) is defined as the 
‘refutation’ sign, M refutes the class concerned. (ii) In case M(a[n]) is defined as 
a positive integer i, M guesses the ith concept in the class. (iii) In case M(o[n]) is 
defined as the integer 0, M makes no guess. (iv) In case M( [n]) is undefined, M is out 
of control. 
For two nonempty finite sequences $i and y9*, we write M(tj,)= M(+,), if(i) both 
M(rjl) and M($,) are undefined, or (ii) both M($,) and M($,) are defined and their 
values are identical. For a nonempty finite sequence $ and an integer i, we write 
M($) = i (resp., M($) > i) if M(II/) is defined as an integer and the value of M($) is equal 
to i (resp., greater than i), In a similar way, we also define the relations 
n;i($,)=k($,), n;i($)=i and fi($)>i. 
Hereafter, for a concept LC U, we write L&, if there is an LiE%’ such that Lt= L. 
In the present paper, we assume that any subset of the universal set can be the target 
concept, when we are considering reliable inference and refutable inference, respective- 
ly. Thus an IIM and an RIIM have to deal with any sequence. This assumption comes 
from the main motivation of this work. Here we note that, however, the choice of the 
family from which a target concept expected to come may have great influence on the 
learning power (cf. [12]). 
Definition. An IIM or an RIIM M is said to converge to an index i for a positive or 
complete presentation o, if there is an n> 1 such that for any man, A?(o[m])= i. 
An RIIM M is said to refute a class %T from a positive or complete presentation o, if 
there is an n 2 1 such that A?(a[n]) is the ‘refutation’ sign. In this case we also say that 
M refutes the class %? from o[n]. 
Let W={Li}ieN be a class. For a concept Lie% and a positive or complete 
presentation r~ of Li, an IIM or an RIIM M is said to infer the concept Li w.r.t. 59 in the 
limit from CJ if M converges to an index j with Lj= Li for CJ. 
(a) An IIM M is said to infer a class W= {Li)ieN in the limit from positive data (resp., 
complete data), if for any Lick, M infers Li w.r.t. W in the limit from any positive 
presentation cr (resp., any complete presentation CJ) of Lj. A class 97 is said to be 
inferable in the limitfrom positive data (resp., complete data), if there is an IIM M which 
infers the class W in the limit from positive data (resp., complete data). 
(b) An IIM M is said to reliably infer a class V from positive data (resp., complete 
data) if it satisfies the following condition: For any nonempty concept L (resp., any 
concept L) and any positive presentation ~7 (resp., any complete presentation a) of L, 
(i) if L&T, then M infers L w.r.t. % in the limit from 0, (ii) otherwise, M does not 
converge to any index for 0. A class V is said to be reliably inferablefrom positive (resp., 
complete data), if there is an IIM M which reliably infers the class %? from positive data 
(resp., complete data). 
(c) An RIIM M is said to refutably infer a class %? from positive data (resp., complete 
data) if it satisfies the following condition: For any nonempty concept L (resp., any 
concept L) and any positive presentation cr (resp., any complete presentation (T) of L, 
(i) if L&Y, then M infers L w.r.t. 59 in the limit from (T, (ii) otherwise, M refutes the class 
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V from 6. A class W is said to be refutably inferable from positive data (resp., complete 
data) if there is an RIIM M which refutably infers the class W from positive data (resp., 
complete data). 
Note that when we consider inductive inference from positive data, we restrict every 
concept to a nonempty concept, because we cannot make any positive presentation of 
the empty concept. 
The notion of reliable inference was introduced by Minicozzi [22] and Blum and 
Blum [ 123 for function learning, and it was adapted to language learning by Osherson 
et al. [25] and Sakurai [29]. By definition, it is easy to see that if a class %’ is refutably 
inferable from positive data (resp., complete data), then % is reliably inferable from 
positive data (resp., complete data). However, the converse does not hold as shown in 
Section 4. 
Note that if an inference machine M does not converge to any index for a positive 
or complete presentation 6, then n;i(a[n]) may be undefined for some n> 1. On the 
other hand, we implicitly use the following proposition in showing some properties on 
inferability. 
Proposition 1. (a) Assume that an IIM M infers a class W in the limit from positive 
data. Then for any nonemptyjnite sequence $ consisting of elements in U ifthere exists 
an Lie% such that all elements in II/ are in Li, then a($) is always defined [14]. 
(b) Assume that an RIIM M refutably infers a class V from positive data. Then for 
any nonempty finite sequence II/ consisting of elements in U, a($) is always defined 
(based on [ 123). 
Similar statements are also valid for the case of complete data. 
The above proposition claims that as far as we feed facts that are from a certain 
concept in the class, an IIM either (i) successively requests another facts in a finite time 
forever or (ii) stops in a finite time after producing some guesses. On the other hand, 
even when we feed any facts that may not be from any concept in the class, an RIIM 
either (i) successively requests another facts in a finite time foreover or (ii) stops in 
a finite time after producing some guesses. 
Since we are considering an indexed family of recursive concepts, every class can be 
inferred from complete data by a simple enumeration method. However, we cannot 
take the class of all recursive concepts as a hypothesis space, because the following 
proposition holds (cf. e.g. [28]). 
Proposition 2. The class %Z of all recursive concepts is not an indexed family of recursive 
concepts. 
In case an RIIM M is fed a positive or complete presentation of a nonrecursive 
concept, M should refute the class. Therefore, even if we could take the class of all 
recursive concepts, it would be still significant to consider refutable inferability. 
For reliable inferability, the following theorem holds. 
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Theorem 3 (Osherson [25], Sakurai [29]). A class G? is reliably inferable from positive 
data if and only if% contains no infinite concept. 
(b) Every class is reliably inferable from complete data. 
In this paper, an effective procedure is said to recursively generate a finite set T if it 
enumerates all elements in T and then halts (cf. [18]). An effective procedure P is said 
to be uniformly and recursively generate a finite-set-valued function F with parameters 
x1, . . . ,x, if P on any input (x1, . . . , x,) in the domain of F recursively generates the 
finite set F(xI, . . . ,x,). A finite-set-valued function F with parameters x1, . . . , x, is said 
to be uniformly and recursively generable if there is an effective procedure which 
uniformly and recursively generates the function F. 
3. Characterizations 
In order to characterize the refutable inferability, we need the following lemma. 
Lemma 4. Let M be an RIIM which refutably infers a class %? from positive data (resp., 
complete data). Then for a nonempty concept L (resp., a concept L), for a positive 
presentation Q (resp., a complete presentation a) of L and for n > 1, ifM refutes the class 
%7 from a[n], then a[n] is not consistent with any Lie%?* 
Proof. Assume that an RIIM M refutes a class %’ from a[n]. Then suppose that there 
is an LiEg such that a[n] is consistent with Li . Let 6 be a positive presentation (resp., 
a complete presentation) of Li . Then the infinite sequence a[n] .6 becomes a positive 
presentation (resp., a complete presentation) of Li. Therefore, M cannot infer Li w.r.t. 
G$ in the limit from o[n] .6, which contradicts the assumption. cl 
By Lemma 4, we obtain the following proposition. 
Proposition 5. (a) Zf a class %? is refutably inferable from positive data, then 
(3.1) for any nonempty concept L&V, there is a finite set TG L such that T is not 
consistent with any LiE%‘. 
(b) If a class 9? is refutably inferable from complete data, then 
(3.2) for any concept L&W, there arejnite sets TS L and FE L” such that (T, F) is not 
consistent with any Lie%‘. 
Proof. We give only the proof of (a). The proof of(b) can be given in a similar way. 
Assume that an RIIM M refutably infers a class %7 from positive data. Let Lie%’ be 
a nonempty concept, and let (r be an arbitrary positive presentation of L. By 
definition, there is an n> 1 such that M refutes the class +2 from o[n]. Let T= a[n]‘. 
Then by Lemma 4, T is not consistent with any LiE%‘. 0 
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Corollary 6. If a class V contains all nonemptyjnite concepts, then %? is not refutably 
inferable from positive data and complete data, respectively. 
Proof. We only give the proof of the case of complete data. The proof for positive data 
can be given in a similar way. 
Assume that a class % contains all nonempty finite concepts. Then let L$V be 
a concept. Let TG L and FE L” be finite sets. (i) In case T is not empty, there is an 
LiE%? with T= Li, and it follows that (T, F) is consistent with Li. (ii) In case Tis empty, 
since F is a finite set, there is an LiE%’ such that F c LF, which means (T,F) is 
consistent with Li. Therefore, by Proposition 5, we see that % is not refutably inferable 
from complete data. 0 
In characterizing the refutable inferability, the notion of consistency plays an 
important role. 
Definition (Based on [l 1,121). Let V= {Li}isN be a class. An RIIM M which re- 
futably infers a class %’ from positive data (resp., complete data) is said to be consistent 
if it satisfies the following condition: For any nonempty concept L (resp., any concept 
L), any positive presentation d (resp., any complete presentation 0) of L and any n 2 1, 
(i) if M(a[n]) is the ‘refutation’ sign, then o[n] is not consistent with any LiE%‘) (ii) if 
M(a[n])>O, then o[n] is consistent with LMCaLnlj. 
An RIIM M which refutably infers a class V from positive data (resp., complete 
data) is said to be responsive if it satisfies the following condition: For any nonempty 
concept L (resp., any concept L), any positive presentation 0 (resp., any 
complete presentation a) of L and any n 2 1 if M does not refute the class ‘3 from a[n], 
then M(a[n])>O holds, that is, while M does not refute the class, M produces a 
guess between any two input requests in the computation of M on input o 
(cf. PI). 
A class V is said to be refutably, consistently and responsively inferable from positive 
data (resp., complete data) if there is a consistently and responsively working RIIM 
which refutably infers the class 5%’ from positive data (resp., complete data). 
In a similary way, we can also define a consistently or responsively working IIM 
(cf. PI). 
Here we note that a consistently and responsively working RIIM refutes a class 
immediately after the observed data become not consistent with any concept in the 
class. 
Since we are considering an indexed family of recursive concepts, we can easily 
show that if a class %? is inferable in the limit from positive data or complete data, then 
it can be achieved by a consistently and responsively working IIM. Furthermore, as 
shown later, if a class % is refutably inferable from positive data or complete data, then 
it can be achieved by a consistently and responsively working RIIM. 
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Definition. For a finite set TG 17, let 
econsP( T) = 
1 if there exists an Lie% such that T is consistent with Li, 
0 otherwise. 
For finite sets T, FE U, let 
econ%(T, F) = 
1 if there exists an LiEW such that (T, F) is consistent with Li, 
o otherwise 
Proposition 7. Zf a class C is refutably inferable from positive data, then 
(3.3) the function econsp for %? is recursive. 
Proof. Assume that an RIIM M refutably infers 59 from positive data. Let 
T=(w,,..., w,}~iY be a nonempty finite set, and put rr=w1,w2, .. . . w,,wl,wl, 
wi, . . . . Clearly, the infinite sequence CJ is a positive presentation of the concept T. 
Thus when we successively feed 0, M either refutes the class $9 or produces an index 
i with T= Li after producing some positive integers. Therefore, we can recursively 
compute the function econs,(T) for %7 as follows: Simulate M with presenting cr. 
During the simulation, (i) if M refutes the class %?, then output 0 and stop, (ii) if 
M produces an index i with TC Li, then output 1 and stop, (iii) otherwise, continue the 
simulation. We note that whether or not TG Li is recursively decidable. By Lemma 4, 
it is clear that the above output agrees with the econs,(T). 0 
Theorem 8 (Based on [ 161). Zf a class %7 is refutably inferable from complete data, then 
(3.4) the function econs, for % is recursive. 
Proof. Assume that an RIIM M refutably infers % from complete data. Let 
T={wl, . . . . w,}cU and F={w,+~ ,..., w,>EU be finite sets. 
It is easy to see that if TnF #0, then econs,(T, F)=O. Thus in what follows, we 
assume Tn F = 8. 
Let$,=(w,,+) ,..., (w.,+),(wn+r,-) ,..., (w,.-),andletul,u, ,... beaneffective 
enumeration of U\(TuF). Then let .Y be the set of all initial segments of ui, u2, . . , 
coupled with + and -, that is, Y= (0; (u 1, +); (Ul, -); (Ul> +x (uz, +); (Ul, +), 
(UZY -); (4, -), (uz, +); (4, -), (uzt -); . ..}. We define the binary relation c over 
Y as follows: @I -C rjz if and only if til is an initial segment of ti2. This gives a partial 
ordering of Y, and it becomes a binary tree, which can be diagramed in Fig. 1. 
Then we define a subtree Y of Y as follows: 
.40={1~?EYIn;i($~.+)#‘refutation’). 
Here we note that if e1 E ti2 and a($,, . +,)=‘refutation’, then n;i(+, . +,)=‘refuta- 
tion’. 
Claim A. The subtree Y isjnite ifand only ifthere is no concept LiEW such that (T, F) 
is consistent with Li. 
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Fig. 1. The binary tree Y. 
Proof of the claim. (I) The ‘q’ part. Assume that there is no concept LiEW such that 
(T,F) is consistent with Li. Then suppose that the subtree Y has an infinite branch, 
say JIi,*2, . . . . By the construction of the subtree 9, there is an infinite sequence 
t1,tz, ee.3 E(+, -} such that for any i>l, Il/i=(U1,tl)y (UZyt2),...,(Ui,ti)e Put B=J/O, 
(ur,r1), @z,tzh..., and let L={ui~U((ui, +)~a, i>,l} be a concept. Then (T,F) is 
consistent with L, and 0 is a complete presentation of L. By assumption, L is not in V, 
and it follows that M refutes W from a[n] for some n > 1. However, by the construc- 
tion, there is a j > 1 such that cr [n] = $,, . +j. This contradicts the assumption of $je Y. 
Thus we see that the subtree Y has no infinite branch, and it follows by Endlichkeits- 
lemma for trees with finite branching (cf. [28, Exercise 9.401) that the subtree Y is 
finite. 
(II) The ‘only if’ part. Assume that the subtree Y is finite. Therefore, the subtree 
Y has no infinite branch. Then suppose that there is an Lie%’ such that (T,F) 
is consistent with Li. For j> 1, let tj= + if ujELi, otherwise, let tj= -. Then 
PUta=~o,(ul,tl),(uz,tz),.... By the construction, cr is a complete presentation of Li. 
Thus M does not refute %? from Q. It is easy to see that this contradicts the 
assumption. 0 
Claim B. There is an LiEW such that (T, F) is consistent with Li if and only if there is 
a +EY such that n;i(~?~.Jl)>O and (T,F) is consistent with LM(~,,.~). 
Proof of the claim. The ‘if’ part is obvious. Thus we only give the proof of the ‘only if’ 
part. Assume that there is an Lied such that (T, F) is consistent with Li. For ja 1, let 
tj= + if ujELi, otherwise let tj= -. Then put ~r=$e, (Ul,tl), (uz,tz), . . . . By the 
construction, c is a complete presentation of Li. Since M infers Li w.r.t. W in the limit 
from C, it follows that there is an n>, 1 such that M(a[n])>O and Li= LM(,,[~]). It is 
easy to see that there is a $E.Y such that e0 * $ = o[n]. q 
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Therefore, we can compute econs,(T,F) as follows: Search for a node $ESP such 
that n?(lc/,, . $) >O and (T, F) is consistent with LM~~,,.~,. By Claims A and B, we see 
that one of the following two cases must happen: 
(1) such a node is found, 
(2) the subtree Y is confirmed to be finite. 
In the case (l), put econs,( T, F) = 1 and in the case (2), put econs,( T, F ) = 0. It is easy 
to see that the result obtained agrees with the definition of econs,(T, F). This 
completes the proof. 0 
We note that the above proof heavily depends on the fact that any RIIM which 
refutably infers a class has to handle any sequence over the universal set (cf. Proposi- 
tion 1). 
Theorem 9. (a) If a class % satisfies the following three conditions, then W is refutably, 
consistently and responsively inferable from positive data. 
(3.1) For any nonempty concept L$%, there is a finite set TEL such that T is not 
consistent with any LiE%. 
(3.3) The function econsrfor W is recursive. 
(3.5) The class W is inferable in the limit from positive data. 
(b) Ifa class W satisjies the following two conditions, then W is refutably, consistently 
and responsively inferable from complete data. 
(3.2) For any concept L 4 %‘, there are jnite sets TG L and FE L” such that (T, F) is 
not consistent with any Lick. 
(3.4) The function econs, for %? is recursive. 
Proof. We only give the proof of (a). The proof of(b) can be given in a similar way, 
where we note that every indexed family of recursive concepts is consistently and 
responsively inferable in the limit from complete data. 
Assume that a class V satisfies the above three conditions (3.1), (3.3) and (3.5). Let 
M be an IIM which infers % in the limit from positive data. Without loss generality, we 
can assume that it works consistently and responsively. Then let us consider the 
procedure in Fig. 2. 
Assume that we feed a positive presentation cr of a nonempty concept L to the 
procedure. 
(I) In case L 4 $7, by condition (3.1), there is a finite set Tc L such that econsp( T) = 0, 
and by the definition of a positive presentation, we see that there is an n > 1 such that 
Tco[n]+. Therefore, the procedure refutes the class V from a[n] and stops. 
(II) In case L&, as easily seen, for any finite set TG L, the value of econs,(T) never 
becomes 0. Since the IIM M infers L w.r.t. GB in the limit from cr, it follows that the 
procedure infers L w.r.t. ‘4? in the limit from 6. 
Furthermore, it is easy to see that the procedure works consistently and respons- 
ively. q 
By Propositions 5 and 7, Theorems 8 and 9, we have the following corollary. 
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Procedure RIIM M 
begin 
T= 8; 
repeat 
read the next fact w and store it in T; 
if econs,(T) = 0 then 
refute the class %? and stop; 
else begin 
simulate M with presenting the fact w until requesting the next fact; 
if M produces a guess then output it; 
end; 
forever; 
end. 
Fig. 2. An inference machine that can refute hypothesis paces from positive data. 
Corollary 10. (a) For a class %‘, the following three statements are equivalent: 
(i) V is refutably inferable from positive data; 
(ii) W is refutably, consistently and responsively inferable from positive data; 
(iii) V satisfies conditions (3.1), (3,3) and (3.5). 
(b) For a class q?, the following three statements are equivalent: 
(i) %? is refutably inferable from complete data; 
(ii) W is refutably, consistently and responsively inferable from complete data; 
(iii) % satisfies conditions (3.2) and (3.4). 
The above conditions heavily depend on each concept rather than the properties of 
the class concerned. Thus we need to investigate another conditions concerned with 
the properties of the class itself. 
Definition. A class W is said to be closed under the subset operation if for any Lie%‘, all 
nonempty subsets of Li are also in the class %?. 
A class V is said to be offinite hierarchy if there is no infinite sequence of concepts 
Li, 3 Li* 3 * * * E% such that Li, GLi, s-0.. 
As easily seen, if a class % has the so-called finite elasticity [40], then $7 is of finite 
hierarchy. Moreover, if a class W is closed under the subset operation and it is of finite 
hierarchy, then V contains no infinite concept, as shown in the proof of Lemma 12. 
Lemma 11. If a class V is refutably inferably from positive data, then g satisjes the 
following two conditions: 
(3.6) V is closed under the subset operation, 
(3.7) ‘S is ofjnite hierarchy. 
66 Y. Mukouchi. S. Arikawa / Theoretical Computer Science 137 (1995) 53-84 
Proof. (I) Suppose that condition (3.6) does not hold, that is, there is a nonempty 
concept L such that L+% and LC Li for some Lick. Then every subset of L is 
consistent with Li. Therefore, by Proposition 5, %? is not refutably inferable from 
positive data. 
(II) Assume that a class G$ is refutably inferable from positive data. Then by above 
(I), condition (3.6) holds. 
Claim. The class %? contains no infinite concept. 
Proof of the claim. Suppose that %? contains an infinite concept Li. Then we see that 
%Z contains all nonempty finite subset Lt, because %F? is assumed to be closed under the 
subset operation. We can show that any RIIM does not infer Li w.r.t. V in the limit 
from a certain positive presentation of Li as in [14]. This is a contradiction. 0 
Now suppose that condition (3.7) does not hold, that is, there is an infinite sequence 
Of concepts Li, , Li,, . . . ET&T such that Li, 5 Li, 5.‘. . Then we consider the concept 
L= u,FEO Li,. Since L is an infinite concept, it follows by the above claim that 
L$%. By the definition of the concept L, we see that for any finite set TG L, there is an 
Li,EV such that T is consistent with Lij. This contradicts the assumption by 
Proposition 5. 0 
Lemma 12. Zf a class %? satisfies the following three conditions, then 59 is refutably, 
consistently and responsively inferable from positive data. 
(3.6) % is closed under the subset operation. 
(3.7) %’ is offinite hierarchy. 
(3.3) The function econs,, for V is recursive. 
Proof. Assume that a class % satisfies the above three conditions. Then by 
Theorem 9, it suffices for us to show that % satisfies conditions (3.1) and (3.5). 
Claim. The class 59 contains no infinite concept. 
Proof of the claim. Suppose that % contains an infinite concept Li. Then all subsets of 
Li are also in ‘X, because %? is assumed to be closed under the subset operation. 
Therefore, there is an infinite sequence of concepts Li,, Liz, . . . E%? such that 
Li, GLi, 5”. 3 which contradicts condition (3.7). 0 
(I) By this claim, we see that %Z is inferable in the limit from positive data, that is, 
condition (3.5) is satisfied (cf. [2]). 
(II) Let L&2? be a nonempty concept. (i) In case L is a finite concept, suppose there 
exists an Lie%’ such that LC Lt. Then LEE holds, because ‘Z is assumed to be closed 
under the subset operation. This contradicts the assumption. Therefore, L is not 
consistent with any L,&?. Hence, it suffices for us to take L itself as T in condition 
Y. Mukouchi, S. Arikawa / Theoretical Computer Science 137 (1995) 53-84 6-l 
(3.1). (ii) In case L is an infinite concept, suppose that condition (3.1) does not hold. 
Then for any finite set Tc L, there is an Lick such that T is consistent with i+. 
However, this implies that the above T’s themselves are in V, because g is assumed to 
be closed under the subset operation. To sum up, every finite set TG L is in %‘, and it 
follows that there is an infinite sequence Li,, LiZ)... such that Li, FLi, $+.. , because 
L is an infinite concept. This contradicts condition (3.7). 0 
By Corollary 10 and Lemmas 11 and 12, we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 13. For a class V, the following four statements are equivalent: 
(i) %? is refutably inferable from positive data; 
(ii) %? is refutably, consistently and responsively inferable from positive data; 
(iii) g satisjes conditions (3.1), (3.3) and (3.5); 
(iv) Q? satisJes conditions (3.6), (3.7) and (3.3). 
Example 1. Let 9%” be the class of all nonempty finite concepts each of which 
cardinality is just n. Then this class is not refutably inferable from positive data for any 
n > 2, because it is not closed under the subset operation. 
In contrast with the above class, let .PZGn be the class of all nonempty finite concepts 
each of which cardinality is at most n. We note that 9gR, I = 9Vi. As easily seen, the 
function econsp for 9V8,, is recursive, because consP( T) = 1 if and only if the cardinal- 
ity of Tis not greater than n. Furthermore, this class is closed under the subset operation 
and of finite hierarchy. Therefore, F%?<” is refutably inferable from positive data. 
Lastly let P&‘* be the class of all nonempty finite concepts (cf. Corollary 6). The 
function econsp for gGQZB* is recursive, because econs,(T)= 1 for any finite set TG U. 
This class is closed under the subset operation but is not of finite hierarchy. Therefore, 
8%* is not refutably inferable from positive data. 
Here we present a sufficient condition for a class to be refutably inferable from 
complete data, which is very strict but widely applicable as shown in Sections 5 and 6. 
The following lemma is basic. 
Lemma 14. Let n> 1 be an integer, let L1, . . . , L, E U be concepts, and let L E U be 
a concept which diflers from L1, . . . , L,. Then for any complete presentation o of L, there 
is an m2 1 such that a[m] is not consistent with any concept Li with 1 <i<n. 
Definition. Let %‘= {Li}ieN be a class, and let Y be a subclass of %?. A set I of indices is 
said to be a cover-index set of S, if the collection of all concepts each of which has an 
index in I is equal to 9, that is, Y= {Lie%‘1 iEZ}. 
Theorem 15. If a class %Z satisfies the following two conditions, then %Z is refutably 
inferable from complete data: 
(3.8) For any WE U, there is a uniformly and recursively generablejinite cover-index 
set of the subclass {LIE% 1 wELi} of V?. 
(3.9) The class V contains the empty concept as its member. 
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Proof. Assume that a class %7 satisfies conditions (3.8) and (3.9). Then let us consider 
the procedure in Fig. 3. 
Roughly speaking, this algorithm works as follows: The while-loop (1) is devoted to 
waiting for the first positive fact with searching for an index of the empty concept by 
an enumeration method. When the first positive fact appears, it recursively generates 
a finite set of indices whose concepts can explain the fact. Then the for-loop (2) is 
devoted to striking off the indices whose concepts contradict observed facts. When all 
of the indices are struck off, the algorithm refutes the hypothesis space. 
Assume that we feed a complete presentation cr of a concept L to the procedure. 
(I) In case L = 0, it is easy to see that the while-loop (1) never terminates and that 
the procedure infers the empty concept w.r.t. V in the limit from 0. 
(II) In case L #0, the procedure terminates the while-loop (1) in a finite time. 
(i) In case LE%, it is easy to see that L is in the subclass {Lie%1 WELi), and it 
follows that there is an index FEZ such that Lj= L. Since I is a finite set, we see by 
Lemma 14 that the for-loop (2) is eventually executed with j~1 such that Lj = L, and 
Procedure RIIM M; 
begin 
T=k F=@ i= 1; 
read-store (T, F); 
while T= 0 do begin 
while F gi LF do i=i+l; 
output i; 
reahstore (T, F); 
end; 
let {w} = T; 
recursively generate a cover-index set of {LiE%’ 1 WELi}, and set it to I; 
for each jel do 
whiie (T, F) is consistent with Lj do begin 
output j; 
read-store (T, F); 
end; 
refute the class %? and stop; 
end; 
Procedure readstore (T, F); 
begin 
read the next fact (w, t); 
if t=‘+‘then T=Tu{w} else F=Fu{w}; 
end. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
- 
Fig. 3. An inference machine that can refute hypothesis spaces from complete data. 
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the while-loop (3) never terminates. That is, the procedure infers L w.r.t. %? in the limit 
from 6. 
(ii) In case L&W, since I is an explicitly given finite set, we see by Lemma 14 that the 
procedure refutes the class V from cr. 0 
Before proceding to the next example, we briefly recall a pattern and a pattern 
language. For more details, please refer to [ 1,2]. 
Fix a nonempty finite alphabet. A pattern is a nonnull finite string of constant and 
variable symbols. The pattern language L(x) generated by a pattern n: is the set of all 
strings obtained by substituting nonnull strings of constant symbols for the variables 
in rr. Since two patterns that are identical except for renaming of variables generate 
the same pattern language, we do not distinguish one from the other. We can 
enumerate all patterns recursively and whether or not w~L(x) for any w and 7t is 
recursively decidable. Therefore, we can consider the class of pattern languages as an 
indexed family of recursive concepts, where the pattern itself is considered to be an 
index. 
Example 2. We consider the class B&Y of pattern languages. As easily seen, the 
empty concept L = 0 is not in B&Y. Furthermore, for any finite set F E U, there is an 
Li~Bd~ such that (0, F) is consistent with Li. In fact, let 1 be the length of the longest 
string in F. Then (0, F) is consistent with the language of the pattern x1x2 . . . x1+1. 
Therefore, by Proposition 5, we see that S&Y is not refutably inferable from 
complete data. 
However, the class B&Y satisfies condition (3.8). In fact, fix an arbitrary constant 
string w. As easily seen, if w~L(n), then rr is not longer than w. The set of all patterns 
shorter than a fixed length is a recursively generable finite set, and whether or not 
WEL(~C) for any w and rr is recursively decidable. Therefore, the set {rr 1 WEL(H)} is 
a recursively generable finite set. 
Thus, by Theorem 15, we see that if we add the empty concept to the class of pattern 
languages, then the obtained class is refutably inferable from complete data. 
4. Comparisons with other identifications 
In this section, by some distinctive examples of classes, we compare the criterion of 
refutable inference with some other criteria. This is motivated by the following 
question: What should we do if we face with facts that are inconsistent with a finitely 
inferred hypothesis? 
In what follows, for the criterion of finite identification for a class of recursive 
concepts, please refer to [23, 18, 151. For the purpose of comparing the inferability 
from positive data with the inferability from complete data, we assume that all 
concepts are nonempty throughout this section. 
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The following proposition is obvious, because for a complete presentation cr of 
a nonempty concept L, we can effectively obtain a positive presentation of L by getting 
rid of all negative facts of cr and repeating a positive fact. 
Proposition 16. If a class %? is inferable in the limit from positive data, then %? is also 
inferable in the limit from complete data. 
Furthermore, the above assertion is still valid ifwe replace the phrase ‘inferable in the 
limit’ with the phrase ‘finitely inferable’, ‘reliably inferable’ and ‘refutably inferable’, 
respectively. 
The following theorem presents an interesting relation between mind changes and 
information presentations. 
Theorem 17 (Lange and Zeugmann [17]). Zf a class %Z is finitely inferable from 
complete data, then %? is also conservatively inferable in the limit from positive data, 
and thus it is inferable in the limit from positive data. 
In [19], more detailed results on mind changes and information presentations have 
been obtained. 
In the following examples, we assume appropriate universal sets and indexing of the 
class. 
Example 3. Again we consider the classes 9%“, S%‘Gn and BV, defined in 
Example 1 (cf. Theorem 3). 
(A.l) For any n>2, the class 9%” is not refutably inferable from complete data. 
In factJet Lc U be a concept with cardinality 1. It is easy to see that there are no 
finite sets Tc L and FE L” that satisfy condition (3.2) in Proposition 5. 
(A.2) For any n> 1, the class 9%” is reliably inferable from positive data. 
(A.3) For any n> 1, the class 9%” is finitely inferable from positive data. 
(B.l) For any n> 1, the class SV<,, is refutably inferable from positive data. 
(B.2) For any n > 1, the class 8%‘<,, is reliably inferable from positive data. 
(B.3) For any na2, the class 9%?,, is not finitely inferable from complete data. 
(C.l) S%?* is not refutably inferable from complete data (cf. Corollary 6). 
(C.2) %%?* is reliably inferable from positive data. 
(C.3) 9%‘* is not finitely inferable from complete data. 
Example 4. Let .Z={a}, L,=(ajlj>l}, and Li={ajI l<j<i-1) for i>2. Then let 
%.Y%= {Li}tEN be the class of interest. 
(D.l) The class %_Y% is refutably inferable from complete data. 
In fact, let L#%?_Y%? be a nonempty concept. Then as easily seen, there is a j > 1 such 
that a’$ L but aj+ ‘EL. Therefore, T= {aj+ ’ } and F = {a’> satisfy condition (3.2). It is 
easy to see that condition (3.4) is also satisfied (cf. Theorem 9). 
(D.2) The class %?Y%Y is not inferable in the limit from positiue data. 
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We note that, in [19], this class was shown to be inferable within one mind change 
from complete data but not inferable in the limit from positive data. 
Example 5. Let BW,, be the class of concepts each of which consists of all multiples 
of at most n prime numbers. For example, the concept (2,4,6, . . . ,7,14,21, . . .} is in 
PB?<i with i>2. 
(E.l) For any n> 1, the class &%J., is refutably inferable from complete data. 
In fact, let L&W,, be a nonempty concept. (i) In case L contains more than 
n prime numbers, let T be a set of some n + 1 prime numbers in L, and let F = 8. (ii) In 
case L contains no prime number, let m be the least integer in L. Then let T= {m} and 
F={l,..., m- l}. (iii) Otherwise, let pl, . . . , pk be all prime numbers in L. As easily 
seen, the following (1) or (2) holds. (1) There is an mgL which is not a multiple of any 
pi with 1 <i < k. Then let T= (m}, and let F be the finite set of all prime numbers less 
than m each of which differs from pl, . . . , pk. (2) There is an m $ L which is a multiple of 
some pi. Then let T= {pl, . . . , pl,} and F = {m}. It is easy to see that the above defined 
T and F satisfy the condition (3.2). Furthermore, it is easy to see that the condition 
(3.4) is satisfied. 
(E.2) For any na 1, the class P’w,, is not reliably inferable from positive data. 
(E.3) For any na2, the class BW,, is not finitely inferable from complete data. 
(E.4) For any na 1, the class BW,, is inferable in the limit from positive data. 
Let P’w, be the class of concepts each of which consists of all multiples of n distinct 
prime numbers. For example, the concept {2,4,6, . . . ,7,14,21, . ..} is in BWZ, but not 
in 8~i with i=l or ia3. We note that BWr=BW,i. 
(F.l) For any ~82, the class BW, is not refutably inferable from complete data. 
In fact, let L = (2). Then for any finite set F c L’, there is a prime number which is 
greater than any integer in F. Therefore, there are no finite sets Tc L and FE L” that 
satisfy condition (3.2). 
(F.2) For any n > 1, the class %?I?, is not reliably inferable from positive data. 
(F.3) For any n> 1, the class BW, is finitely inferable from positive data. 
Example 6. Again we consider the class P’dY of pattern languages. As easily seen 
from Theorem 15 and Example 2, the empty concept is the only concept that does not 
satisfy condition (3.2). Since all concepts are assumed to be nonempty in this section, 
the class of pattern languages is shown to be refutably inferable from complete data. 
(G.l) P’dY is refutably inferable from complete data. 
(G.2) B&Y is not reliably inferable from positioe data. 
(G.3) P’dY is finitely inferable from complete data but not finitely inferable from 
positive data. (cf. [23, 171). 
(G.4) P&Y is inferable in the limit from positive data (cf. [2]). 
We can summarize the above comparisons in Fig. 4. 
In the figure, the prefix ‘LIM’, ‘FIN’, ‘REV or ‘REF’ means the collection of all 
classes that are ‘inferable in the limit’, ‘finitely inferable’, ‘reliably inferable’ or ‘re- 
futably inferable’, respectively, and the postfix ‘TXT’ or ‘INF ’ means ‘from positive 
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LI)II-ISF = IlEI:ISF 
Fig. 4. Comparisons with other identifications. 
data’ or ‘from complete data’, respectively. For example, REF-TXT is the collection of 
all classes that are refutably inferable from positive data. 
The classes 9W1, .9Vn, %%‘,, and 9V* consist of all finite concepts each of which 
cardinality is just 1, n 2 2, at most n and unrestricted finite, respectively (cf. Example 3). 
The class KY% has been shown in Example 4. The classes S%?i, 5%” and PW,, 
consist of all multiples of a prime number, n > 2 distinct prime numbers and at most 
n prime numbers, respectively (cf. Example 5). The class B&Y is the class of a pattern 
languages (cf. Example 6). The class 9’9% is the so-called superfinite class [ 141, that 
is, a class contains all finite concepts and at least one infinite concept. 
In Fig. 4, we see that a subclass of a refutably inferable class is not always refutably 
inferable. 
5. Unions of some classes 
In this section we consider two type of union classes. First we take a class as the 
collection of all concepts from n classes. 
Definition. Let n 2 1 be an integer, and let Wr , . . . , ‘37” be classes. For i with 1 < i < n and 
j> 1, the jth concept Lj of the class Vi is denoted by Lci,j). Then the union class of 
Q? r, . . . ,V, is represented as 
iel ~i={L~i,j)}l~i~n,jeWI. 
By assuming a bijective coding from { 1, . . . ,n} x N to N, the new class above 
becomes an indexed family of recursive concepts. 
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Theorem 18. Let n2 1 be an integer, and let VI, . . . , W,, be classes each of which is 
refutably inferable from positive data (resp., complete data). Then the class UFzI Vi is 
refutably inferable from positive data (resp., complete data). 
Proof. We only give the proof of the case of positive data. The proof for complete data 
can be given in a similar way. 
For any i with 1~ i < n, let Mi be an RIIM which refutably infers %‘i from positive 
data. Then let us consider the procedure in Fig. 5. 
Assume that we feed a positive presentation (r of a nonempty concept L to the 
procedure. 
(I) In case LF$~:= 1 Vi, then for any i with 1 <i <n, L#%‘i holds, and it follows that 
Mi refutes the class %‘i from cr. Thus the procedure refutes the class Uy= 1 %‘i from cr. 
(II) In case LEU~,~ Vi, let i,, be the least integer such that LE%‘i,,. Then for any 
i with 1~ i<i,,, L#%‘i holds, and it follows that Mi refutes the class Vi from 0. 
Therefore, the for-loop in the procedure reaches the case of i= i,,. Since Mi, infers 
L w.r.t. %iO in the limit from cr, it follows that M, converges to an index j with 
L(iO,j)= L for CJ. Thus the procedure converges to the coding of (iO, j) for G. That is, the 
procedure infers L w.r.t. lJy= 1 %‘i in the limit from 6. 
Thus the procedure refutably infers the class Ul=, %‘i from positive data. 0 
A similar theorem is also valid for reliable inference (cf. [22, 121). As stated in [12], 
it can be generalized to effective infinite unions for reliable inference. As easily seen, 
however, it cannot be done for refutable inference. The class 9%‘* is a good example 
for this difference (cf. Example 3). 
We now consider a class of concepts each of which is a union of at most n concepts 
from n class (cf. [40]). 
Procedure RIIM M; 
begb 
for i=l to ndo 
while Mi does not refute the class %‘i do begin 
simulate Mi with presenting facts read so far; 
during the simulation, 
if Mi requests another fact then 
read the next fact and present it to Mi; 
if Mi produces a guess j then 
output the coding of (i,j); 
end; 
refute the class U,!‘=, %r and stop; 
end. 
Fig. 5. An RIIM for unions by U. 
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Definition. Let n 2 1 be an integer, and let WI, . . . , V, be classes. For i with 1~ i<n 
and j>O, LC,.j> denotes the empty concept ifj=O, otherwise the jth concept Lj of the 
class %?i. Then we define a class generated by W1, . . . , %Zn as follows: 
fi wi={ fi L:i,ji,l(i~,...,j”)~~n~, 
i=l i=l 
where JV” is the set of all n-tuples of nonnegative integers, that is, JV” = (0, 1,2,. . . 1”. 
By assuming a bijective coding from JV” to i%, the new class above becomes an 
indexed family of recursive concepts. 
Each class satisfies the condition (3.9, then the above class is shown to be refutably 
inferable from complete data. 
Theorem 19. Let n $1 be an integer, and let VI, . , . , V,, be classes each of which satisfies 
condition (3.8). Then the class ul=, %‘i is refutably inferable from complete data. 
Proof. Let us consider the procedure in Fig. 6, where the procedure read-store is the 
same one as in Fig. 3 and 1 is a special element not in the universal set U. 
Assume that we feed a complete presentation Q of a concept Lbase to the procedure. 
(A) In case Lbase~UyC1 %‘i, let NE(m)={(jI, . . ..jn)~N”I there are just 
m nonempty concepts among L<l,jl), . . . , L<,,j.>}. 
Claim. In the procedure, for any m with 0 <m 6 n, if T,,, and F, are defined, then 
(T,, F,) is not consistent with (L~l,j,)u..‘UL~,,j,))for any (Jo, . . . ,j,kNE(m). 
Proof of the claim. This proof is given by mathematical induction on m. 
(I) In case m=O, it is clear because T,, is nonempty and the union of n empty 
concepts is empty. 
(II) In case m3 1, we assume the claim for m- 1, and assume that T,,, and F, are 
defined. Then suppose that there is an n-tuple (k,, . . . , k&NE(m) such that (T,, F,) is 
consistent with (L~l,k,~u...uL~.,k,)). Then (T,,_l, F,-l) is consistent with 
(L<l,k,,u”’ u&k,)), because T,,,_ 1 E T,,, and F,_, E F, hold. 
Now suppose that there is an i2 1 such that L<i,ki) #8 and (Lci,ki)nT,,,_ 1)=8. Then 
T,-, ~(L<l,kl>up*- vL<i-l~ki_,)uL<i+l,k.+~~~‘~. uL<n,k,>) and F,-I WCI,~,>U*Q 
L~n,kn))cC(L~~,k,~u”‘uL~i-~,ki_1~uL~i+~,k,+l~~.“uL~~,k,))E hold. This means that 
(T,,,+F,& is consistent with (L~~,k,~u’..uL~i-~,ki_,)~L~i+~,k,+,~u.”~L~,,k,)). 
This contradicts the induction hypothesis, because (k, ,, . . . , ki- 1, 0, ki+ 1, . . . , k,)E 
NE(m - 1). 
Thus we have (L<i,k;)n T,_ 1 ) # 0 for any i with L<i,ki j # 8. Therefore, we can take UPS 
as follOws: If L~i,ki) #0, then uiE(L<i,ki>nTm- I), otherwise Ui=l. Since all UI(S are in 
(T,_,u{A}) and the number of U;S other than 1 is just m, the n-tuple (q,, . . . ,u.) is in 
Y,,,. Thus there is a case where the for-loop (2) is executed with (ul, . . . , u,). In this case 
there is an n-tuple (k;, . . . , k;)ESI x +.. x S, such that for any i with 1 < i < n, Lk; = Lki. 
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Procedure RIIM M; 
begin 
T=& F=& 
read store (T, F); 
while T=@ do begin 
output the coding of (0, . . . ,O); 
read-store (T, F); 
end; 
To= T; Fo=F; 
(1) 
form=1 tondobegin 
let Fm= 
I 
(w 1,...,%) the number of WI’S 
W,- 1 W)“ other than Iz is just m 1. ’ 
for each (wl, . . . . w,)E~~ do begin 
fori=l tondo 
if Wi=l then let Si= (0) 
else recursively generate a cover-index set w.r.t. %‘i 
of {L<i,j>E%‘i 1 wiEL<i,j>}, and set it to Si; 
if all Sis are nonempty then 
for each (j, , . . . ,j&S1 x 1.. x S, do 
while (T, F) is consistent with (L~,,jl)u..‘uL~,,j,,) do begin. 
output the coding of (j, , . . . , j,); 
readstore (T, F); 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
end; 
T,,,=T; F,=F; 
end; 
refute the class u,r=, vi and stop; 
end, 
Fig. 6. An RIIM for unions by u. 
Thus there is a case where the for-loop (3) is executed with (k;, . . . , k:). Since (T,, F,) is 
consistent with (Lcl,k’lju--. uL<,,~;)), it follows that for any finite sets Tc T,,, and 
FGF,, (T, F) is consistent with (L~l,k;~u...uL~,,L~)). However, the while-loop (4) 
should terminate with Tc T,,, and FE F,, because T,,, and F, are assumed to be 
defined. This is a contradiction. 0 
Since Lbase E ui:= 1 Wi, there are an m. with 0 <m. <n and an n-tuple (j,, . . . , j,) such 
that (j, , . . . ,j,)ENE(m,) and Lbase=(L(l,jl)u...uL<n,j”~). By this claim, we see that 
T,, and F,, are never defined. By Lemma 14, this means that the procedure outputs 
the coding of an n-tuple (j,, . . ..j.) with Lbase=(L~l,jl)u...uL~,,jn)) and the while- 
loop (1) or (4) never terminates. 
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(B) In case Lbase$U~=l pi, by using Lemma 14 n times, we see that the procedure 
refutes the class u:= 1 %‘i from c. 0 
Example 7. We consider the class B&S of pattern languages. As shown in Example 
2, the class satisfies condition (3.8). Therefore, by Theorem 19, for any n > 1, the class 
of unions of at most n pattern languages is refutably inferable from complete data. 
By Corollary 6, we see that if the number of patterns is not bounded by a constant 
number, then the class is not refutably inferable from complete data, because it 
contains all nonempty finite languages. 
We note that for any n> 1, the class of unions of at most n pattern languages is 
shown to be inferable in the limit from positive data (cf. [40, 32, 331). 
6. EFS definable classes 
In this section, we consider the so-called model inference (cf. [30]) and language 
learning using elementary formal systems (EFSs). 
The EFSs were originally introduced by Smullyan [37] to develop his recursion 
theory. In a word, EFSs are a kind of logic programming language which uses 
patterns instead of terms in first order logic [41], and they are shown to be natural 
devices to define languages [S]. 
In this paper, we briefly recall EFSs. For detailed definitions and properties of 
EFSs, please refer to [37, 5, 8, 9, 413. 
Let C, X and U be mutually disjoint nonempty sets. We assume that C is finite, and 
fix it throughout this section. Elements in C, X and II are called constant symbols, 
variables and predicate symbols, respectively. By p, q, pl, pz, . . . , we denote predicate 
symbols. Each predicate symbol is associated with a positive integer which we call an 
arity. 
In general, for a set S, S ’ denotes the set of all nonempty finite strings over S, and 
#S denotes the cardinality of S. 
Definition. A term, or a pattern, is an element in (CuX)‘, that is, it is a nonnull string 
over(CuX). Byrr,rc,,rr, ,..., we denote terms. A term 71 is said to be ground if rr~C +. 
BY w, WI, ~2, . . . . we denote ground terms. 
An atomic formula (atom) is an expression of the form p(rcl, . . . , n,), where p is 
a predicate symbol with arity n, and q, . . . , n, are terms. By A,B,A1,A2, . . . , we 
denote atoms. An atom ~$71~) . . . ,n,) is said to be ground if rci, . . . , n,, are ground terms. 
We define the well-formed formulas and clauses in the ordinary ways [20]. 
Definition. A definite clause is a clause of the form 
A+-Bi, . . . ,B,, 
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where n>O, and A, B1, . . . , B, are atoms. The atom A above is called the head of the 
clause, and the sequence B1, . . . , B, is called the body of the clause. By C, D, Cr , Cz, . . . , 
we denote definite clauses. Then an EFS is a finite set of definite clauses, each of which 
is called an axiom. 
A substitution is a homomorphism from terms to terms which maps each symbol 
aEC to itself. 
In the world of EFSs, the Herbrand base (HB) is the set of all ground atoms. 
A subset I of HB is called an Herbrand interpretation. We also define Herbrand model, 
and the last Herbrand model in the ordinary ways [20]. 
For an EFS r, the least Herbrand model is denoted by M(T). For an EFS r and 
a predicate symbol p with arity n, we define the set of n-tuples of ground terms as 
follows: 
In case the arity of p is 1, i.e. p is unary, we regard L(T,p) as a language over C. 
We now put a syntactical restriction on EFSs, because the least Herbrand model 
M (r ) for an unrestricted EFS I’ may not be recursive, that is, for a ground atom A, we 
cannot recursively decide whether or not AeM( 
For a term rr, I(AIJ denotes the length of rr, and o(x,n) denotes the number of all 
occurrences of a variable x in K. For an atom p(zl, . . . , rr,), we define the length of the 
atom and the number of variable’s occurrences in the atom as follows: 
Definition. A clause AcB 1, . . . , B, is said to be length-bounded if 
II A0 II 2 II BI 0 II + ~1. + II W II 
for any substitution 0. 
An EFS r is said to be length-bounded if all axioms of r are length-bounded. 
The notion of length-bounded clauses is characterized by the following lemma. 
Lemma 20 (Arikawa et al. [8,9]). A clause A+-Bt , . . . , B, is length-bounded, ifand only 
II A(1 2 llBl II +...+ (lB,II and 0(x, A)>,o(x, Bt)-t a..+o(x, B,) holdfor any uariable x. 
From now on, we only consider length-bounded EFSs. For length-bounded EFSs, 
the following theorem holds. 
Theorem 21 (Arikawa et al. [S, 93, Yamamoto [41]). For a length-bounded EFS r, the 
least Herbrand model M(T) is recursive, that is, for any ground atom A, whether or not 
AEM (r) is recursively decidable. 
Furthermore, the following theorem shows the power of length-bounded EFSs. 
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Theorem 22 (Arikawa et al. [S, 91). A language L E C + is context-sensitive if and only 
if L is definable by a length-bounded EFS. 
We devote the rest of this section to investigating the refutable inferability of 
length-bounded EFS definable classes. We adjust the definitions of inferability to the 
case of EFSs as follows, but as easily seen, the essential part is kept unchanged from 
definitions in Section 2. In what follows, we assume that outputs from an IIM or an 
RIIM are EFSs. 
Definition. For an atom A, pred(A) denotes the predicate symbol of A. For a set 
n, GU and a set S of atoms, St”,, denotes the set of atoms restricted to De, that is, 
SI,,={AES 1 pred(A)EHe}. 
A predicate-restricted complete presentation of a set Ic HB w.r.t. II,sZZ is an 
infinite sequence (A,, tl), (A,, t2), . . . . of elements in HBI,, x { +, -} such that 
{AiIti=+, i>l}=lln, and {AiIti=-, i21}=HBIn,\IIn,. 
An IIM M or an RIIM M is said to converge to an EFS r for a presentation CT, if 
there is an n2 1 such that for any man, n;i(a[m])= r. 
Let &J’V be a class of EFSs. For an EFS TEC%? and a predicate-restricted complete 
presentation (r of M(T) w.r.t. n, sn, an IIM M or an RIIM M is said to infer the EFS 
r w.r.t. 8’59 in the limit from o if M converges to an EFST’&V with 
M(T’)lnO=M(T)lnO for cr. 
A class b% is said to be theoretical-term-freely inferable in the limit from complete 
data, if for any nonempty finite subset n, of n, there is an IIM M which infers r w.r.t. 
&Z in the limit from c for any EFS re&47 and any predicate-restricted complete 
presentaion 0 of M(T) w.r.t. n,. 
A class 6% is said to be theoretical-term-freely and refutably inferable from complete 
data, if for any nonempty finite subset n,-, of n, there is an RIIM M which satisfies the 
following condition: For any set I c HB and any predicate-restricted complete pre- 
sentation o of I w.r.t. ZZ,, (i) if there is an EFS T&Q? such that M(r)lno=Zlno, then 
M infers r w.r.t. 6% in the limit from C, (ii) otherwise M refutes the class &Z from cr. 
Theoretical terms are supplementary predicates that are necessary for defining 
some goal predicates. In the above definition, the phrase ‘theoretical-term-freely 
inferable’ means that from the only facts on the goal predicates, an IIM or an RIIM 
generates ome suitable predicates and infers an EFS which explains the goal predi- 
cates. 
Definition. For two EFSs r and r’, and a set Z7, E ZZ, we write r sno r’, if we can 
make r’ identical to r by renaming predicate symbols other than those in n, and by 
renaming variables in each axiom. We assume some canonical form of an EFS w.r.t. 
ZI,, and canon(r,ne) denotes the representative EFS of the set of EFSs 
{r’lr Enor’}. 
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For an EFS r, HPRED(r) (resp., BPRED(F)) denotes the set of all predicate 
symbols appearing in the heads (resp., the bodies) of the axioms of r, and PRED(F) 
denotes the set HPRED(F)uBPRED(F). We also define various sets and classes as 
follows: 
YWt”] = {r 1 r is a length-bounded EFS with n axioms), 
2?9P [II,] = {canon(T,ZZO) ( r~99P}, 
JYYS~[“~ [II,] = {kP~~“‘[l7,,] 1 BPRED(F)GHPRED(F)}, 
dl%3P’[n,](l)= rEJtYL.E#“‘[n,] 
i 
the head’s length of each axiom 
of r is not greater than 1. ’ 
“4Ezw”“‘[nO] = lj ./MYPW[“[nO], 
i=O 
.M9w[-‘[nO](l)= (J 4u?4vi’[no](l), 
i=O 
where 1, n >, 0, and ITo E 17. 
We note that for any EFSs r and I”, and any IT, GZI, whether or not r snO r’ is 
recursively decidable, and that we can effectively obtain the EFS canon(r,ZIo). 
We prepare some basic lemmas. 
Lemma 23 (Shinohara [33]). Let F be a length-bounded EFS, and let AEM be 
a ground atom. Then if F has an axiom C whose head is longer than A, then 
AEM(F\ {C}) holds. 
Lemma 24. For any EFS FeYWIG”l and any ZI,sl7, there is an EFS 
rk49@~~lp70~ such that hqrf)lno=M(r)lno. 
Proof. Let r~9’Btqf11 and rI =canon(r,lT,). Then M(T,)I,,=M(T)I,, holds. 
Therefore, if BPRED(F,)cHPRED(I’,), then rI itself is in A9@‘“] [IT,]. Other- 
wise, let Tz be the EFS which is obtained from rI by subtracting all axioms that have 
predicate symbols in BPRED(F,)\HPRED(T,) in their bodies, and let r3= 
canon (r,, II,). Then clearly, M (r,) Ino = M(T) Jno and r3 EAY9tGn1 [IT,] hold. 0 
Lemma 25. Let n > 1 be an integer, let IZ, zl7 be a set of predicate symbols, let 
TE HBlno be a nonemptyfinite set, and let F c HBlno be a$nite set. Assume that (T, F) 
is not consistent with M(F)lnO for any EFS F~&YO[“-‘l[lTo]. Then for any 
EFSFEJZYW~“~[IZ,]\ JZ_~?@“~[L~,](I), (T, F) is not consistent with M(F)lno, where 
l=max{ (/AI\ IAET). 
Proof. Let r~.MY49wtn1 [IT,] \ AYWrnl [ILo]( Then there is a length-bounded clause 
CEI’ whose head’s length is greater than 1. Let Tr=T\{C}. Suppose that (T, F) is 
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consistent with M(r)ln,. Since the head of C is longer than every ground atom in T, it 
follows by Lemma 23 that TEM(F,)I,,. Furthermore, since r1 zr, it follows that 
M(T~)GM(T) by monotonicity of the least Herbrand model. Therefore, 
F~HBI”,\M(~)I”,~HBI”,\M(T,)I,, holds. Thus (T, F) is consistent with 
M(~I)I”,. Let Tz =canon (r,, Z7,). Then M(T,) Ino = M(T,) Ino holds, and it follows 
that (T,F) is consistent with M(Tz)lno. This contradicts the assumption, because 
l-,&4%9~‘[“-1’[zz,]. 0 
Lemma 26. For any 1, n 2 0 and any finite subset IT, of IT, the set &LG?@“~ [IT,](l) is 
a uniformly and recursively generable finite set. 
Proof. As easily seen, for any EFS F~AA.Y~[“1[17,](l), the number of predicate 
symbols appearing in r is at most n and the arities of those predicate symbols are at 
most 1. 
Put PA(l,m)={{qp”, . . . ,q~~}lO<k~mandl~j,<~~~~jk~l},whereforapredi- 
cate symbol qi(f), the superscript t represents its arity. Then put PR(1, n, IT,)= 
{ZT’uIT N I II’s Ii’, and ~“EPA (1, n - # IT’)}. By the above observation, it is sufficient 
for us to generate EFSs r with PRED(I’)EPR(~, n,l7,), because we do not distinguish 
two EFSs that are identical except for renaming of predicate symbols other than those 
in J7,. 
As easily seen, the above PR(1, n, II,) is a uniformly and recursively generable finite 
set. Furthermore, the set of all terms shorter than a fixed length is a uniformly and 
recursively generable finite set, where we do not distinguish two terms that are 
identical except for renaming of variables. 
Roughly speaking, we recursively generate EFSs in _&.%‘9Yt”l [l7,] (1) as follows: We 
combine sets of predicate symbols in PR(l, n, II,) and terms whose lengths are not 
greater than 1, rearrange variables in each axiom, make canonical form w.r.t. ZI, of 
them and check whether or not each obtained EFS is in .&5?~?8[[“~[l7,](1) by using 
Lemma 20. 0 
Theorem 27. For any n 2 0, the class 993r’n1 is theoretical-term-freely and refutably 
inferable from complete data. 
Proof. Let us consider the procedure in Fig. 7, where the procedure read-store is the 
same one as in Fig. 3. 
Let l7, be a nonempty finite subset of l7, and let I base E HB be a set of ground atoms. 
Then assume that we feed a predicate-restricted complete presentation cr of Ibase w.r.t. 
n, to the procedure. 
(A) In case there is an EFS rbase~_Y@Gnl such that Zbaselno= A4(rbase)lno. 
Claim. In the procedure, for any m with 0 <m <n if T,,, and F, are defined, then (T,,,, F,) 
is not consistent with M(F)lno for any EFS I’G.MY~~[[“~[IT,,]. 
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Procedure RIIM M (n,Ilo); 
begin 
T=8; F=ti 
readstore (T, F); 
while T= 8 do begin 
output the empty EFS; 
read-store (T, F); 
end; 
T,=T; Fo=F; 
for m = 1 to n do begin 
L=max{ /IAIl IAET,,,-~}; 
recursively generate A9~t”‘l[~,](I,,,), and set it to S; 
for each TES do 
while (T, F) is consistent with M(T)!“,, do begin 
output r; 
readstore (T, F); 
end; 
T,,,=T; F,=F; 
end; 
refute the class P@““] and stop; 
end. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Fig. 7. An RIIM for the class LZ#s”l. 
Proof of the claim. This proof is given by mathematical induction on m. 
(I) In case m = 0, it is clear because To is nonempty and the least Herbrand model 
of the empty EFS is empty. 
(II) In case m 2 1, we assume the claim for m- 1, and assume that T,,, and F, are 
defined. Then we see that T,,_, and F,_l are also defined, and by the induction 
hypothesis, (Tm_l,F,_,) is not consistent with M(T)jno for any EFS 
T~AZ_Y#“- ‘I [n,]. Therefore, by Lemma 25, (T,,,_ 1, F,_ 1) is not consistent with 
M(T)lno for any EFS r~~~~~~l[n,]\~~~[~l[n,](I,). Thus (T,,,,F,) is not 
consistent with M (T)lno for any EFS I’~A_Y9Jtm1 [n,] \dY@“” [n,] (&,A, because 
T,,,_lcT,,, and F,_,GF, hold. 
Furthermore, since the for-loop (2) terminates, we see that (T,,,, F,) is also not 
consistent with M(T)ln,, for any EFS TICA_%‘@“’ [n,] (I,). 
Hence we have the claim for m. •i 
By Lemma 24, there is an EFS rE.,UTa rG”l[n,] such that M(T)I,,=M(rb,,,)I,, 
( = Ibase Ino). Therefore, we see by the above claim that T, and F, are never defined. By 
Lemma 14, this means that the procedure outputs an EFS r with M(T)ln,=lbaseIno 
and the while-loop (1) or (3) never terminates. 
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(B) In case there is no EFS T~9@G”l such that Zbaselno=M(F)lno. By using 
Lemma 14 n times, we see that the procedure refutes the class _Y$8tGnl from cr. 0 
By Corollary 6, we see that if the number of axioms is not bounded by a constant 
number, then this class is not refutably inferable, because it contains all nonempty 
finite concepts on HBl no. 
The following corollary is obvious from Theorem 27. 
Corollary 28. For any n>O, the class of languages definable by EFSs in _Y3ffGn1 is 
refutably inferable from complete data. 
We note that Shinohara [33] showed that the classes in Theorem 27 and Corollary 
28 are inferable in the limit from positive data. 
7. Concluding remarks 
We have pointed out that the essence of the computational logic of scientific 
discovery or the logic of machine discovery should be the refutability of the whole 
space of hypotheses by observed data or given facts. Then we have shown a series of 
such sufficiently large hypothesis spaces in terms of the elementary formal systems. 
More exactly, for any n the class of length-bounded EFSs with at most n axioms are 
refutably identifiable. The argument o prove this is also valid for the classes of weakly 
reducing EFSs, and linear or weakly reducing logic programs [31, lo] with at most 
n axioms. 
The refutability we proposed here forms an interesting contrast to the original one: 
In the logic of scientific discovery for scientists each theory in a hypothesis pace is to 
be refutable, while in the computational version of the logic for machines or the logic 
of machine discovery the space itself is to be refutable by an observation. Popper 
contributed to the modern theory of inductive inference. In his books [26, 271, 
however, Popper strongly denied the induction so far developed by, for example, Mill 
[21], which had two stages of mechanical creation of a hypothesis from observations 
and proof of its validity. In fact, he said that the induction, i.e., inference based on 
many observations was a myth and it was neither a psychological fact, nor a fact of 
ordinary life, nor one of scientific procedure [26]. What he wanted to assert in those 
books was that scientific theory should have been refuted by observed data or facts 
and any such theory could by no means be verified. He could not agree with the 
assertion that the induction should have proved the validity of theory. However, we 
think there were no reasons to deny the stage of mechanical creation of hypotheses. 
The inductive inference machine that can refute the hypothesis pace itself works as 
an automatic system for scientific discovery. If the machine for scientific discovery 
cannot refute the whole space of hypotheses, it can just work for computer-aided 
scientific discovery. That is, we need to check from time to time whether the machine 
is still searching for a possible hypothesis. 
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As a future work we have left the refutability of hypothesis spaces in another two 
major frameworks of PAC and MAT learning [39,3], which we will discuss elsewhere. 
As for the PAC learning we obtained very practical results in the area of Molecular 
Biology based on our theoretical studies on learnability [6,7,35]. Our learning 
system succeeded in discovering some simple and accurate knowledge, i.e., hypothe- 
ses, in a very short time. However, it was still an application of PAC learning, but not 
machine discovery. In such a system we could not have any way to stop the learning 
algorithm even when there remains no possibility to find any good hypotheses to 
explain the data or facts given so far. We were lucky, because the hypotheses our 
learning system found out happened to be in the spaces we initially gave. The spaces 
were natural subclasses of the refutably inferable classes we have shown in the last 
section. 
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